Four rotors and a prayer: How Russia built a billion-ruble drone industry using Chinese parts

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Float like a pizza, sting like a Sibiryachok

In 2023, the Center for Urban Air Mobility Management (UAMOC, or «ЦУГАМ» in Russian) — a company established under the Moscow Innovation Cluster (MIC) — promised that drones would soon deliver groceries and parcels from supermarkets like VkusVill and Pyaterochka, monitor construction sites, and inspect telecom towers from the air. Deputy CEO Andrey Anikin claimed that agreements had already been signed with retail groups X5 Group and VkusVill, national postal provider Russian Post, and Dodo Pizza — although none of these companies confirmed the development.

No drone-based pizza delivery service ever launched in Moscow in 2024 or 2025. However, UAMOC rapidly emerged as one of the fastest-growing companies that got its start after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Its secret to success: acquiring stakes in nearly every drone manufacturer whose equipment is currently deployed by the Russian military in Ukraine.

Even as Anikin pitched investors a cyberpunk vision of Moscow, UAMOC had already invested in drone manufacturers like Harpyia, Sibiryachok (lit. “Little Siberian”), and Bumerang (previously covered by The Insider). A few months later, with Moscow’s airspace still closed to drones, UAMOC opened a factory and testing site at the Luhansk Aviation Repair Plant in occupied Ukraine and began training operators in a garage cooperative in illegally annexed Sevastopol.

“Last year we exceeded a production rate of 70,000 drones per year,” a spokesperson for Sibiryachok told state-controlled news agency RIA Novosti. The spokesperson notably failed to mention that the company is part of the Moscow Innovation Cluster, or that production is funded by tens of billions of rubles from the Moscow government budget.

The MIC website uses Silicon Valley-style buzzwords like “venture center,” “urban tech projects,” “tech project scaling,” and “prototype exchange.” UAMOC is headed by Olga Sokolova, former CEO of NPO Molniya, which she once described in an interview as the “Soviet Silicon Valley.”

Nonetheless, UAMOC and its subsidiaries have received little coverage in Russian business media — which is surprising, given that these companies generated 28 billion rubles ($346 million) in revenue in 2023–2024, accounting for roughly a quarter of the entire Russian drone market. For context, the total revenue of all Russian industrial robot manufacturers in 2024 was 4.6 billion rubles ($56 million), while scientific and technical research firms — excluding those involved in military drone production — earned 65 billion rubles ($803 million).

Drone fever

Since 2023, Russia has seen record growth in the number of newly registered companies producing aircraft, adding 407 such firms in total. Many of these are drone-related, The Insider has established, and many supply drones that are used directly on the battlefield.

The Insider identified at least 140 drone manufacturers, ranging from brand-new DIY shops to legacy Soviet-era design bureaus, along with more than 60 other companies and organizations that supply parts, resell drones, or train operators. A complete list of these entities (in both Russian and English) is available here.

Together, these businesses earned over 136 billion rubles ($1.68 billion) in 2024, and their combined investment inflow for 2023-2024 reached 243 billion rubles ($3.00 billion). For context, the Russian government plans to spend 277 billion rubles ($3.43 billion) over the next six years on the country’s entire nuclear energy sector. Similar six-year budgets are planned for waste recycling, sewage treatment, and cleaning up major environmental disasters.

In reality, UAMOC and dozens of the other drone manufacturers that have emerged in Russia over the past three years have become high-tech “unicorns.” Some now generate revenues in the hundreds of millions — or even billions — of rubles. Yet state propaganda portrays these firms as innovative tech startups rather than as producers of weapons of war. Promotional videos on Russian pro-war channels seem aimed less at military clients than at potential future “pilots” — the country’s youth, including schoolchildren.

Under civilian cover

Companies often conceal the fact that their drones are primarily produced for military use. Instead, they officially present themselves as manufacturers of civilian UAVs. Drone maker Supercam, for instance, details on its website how its products are used in agriculture, the oil and gas sector, power generation, and environmental monitoring. Indeed, these drones are actively used by Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations, forestry agencies, and environmental organizations — but they are also used in combat.

To meet growing demand, Supercam was forced to significantly expand its production and, according to the local outlet YA62.ru, even purchased the Solnechny shopping center in Ryazan. The former site of a Lenta chain supermarket has since been converted into a facility for assembling military reconnaissance drones.

The Russian government has faced significant difficulties in managing civilian drone procurement. According to the business daily Vedomosti, by April 2025, a state order placed in 2024 for just 3,000 civilian drones remained unfulfilled. Aside from the obvious reason — that manufacturers are preoccupied with military drone production — the issue also stems from a lack of funding. As reported by Kommersant, due to bureaucratic hurdles producers were unable to access state contract funds.

Since April 2024, responsibility for coordinating civilian drone procurement has fallen to the State Transport Leasing Company (GTLK), which is tasked with assessing demand from state enterprises and distributing orders to manufacturers. In 2024, GTLK signed 2.2 billion rubles' ($27.2 million) worth of contracts for drone deliveries to public institutions.

Still, civilian drone procurement is dwarfed by military demand. Last summer, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed that up to 4,000 drones per day were being delivered to the front. By December, Belousov revised the figure downward, but it was still massive — “over 100,000 drones have been acquired from small design bureaus and civilian producers,” he said. By late 2024, these manufacturers were turning out up to 40,000 UAVs and FPV drones per month, according to the defense minister.

Dependency on China

Back in 2022, FPV drones were limited to operational ranges of 2 kilometers and could perform only basic functions — such as dropping munitions. But the military soon adopted relay drones, enabling strikes deep behind enemy lines. A shortage of conventional ammunition pushed both Russia and Ukraine to scale up its capacities for drone warfare, using UAVs for more precise aerial attacks.

Initially, the Russian military relied heavily on lightweight Chinese consumer drones — the so-called “wedding drones” made by DJI, Autel, and other smaller manufacturers. After multiple investigations revealed the fact of their use in combat, China restricted exports. An investigation by OCCRP and the independent Russian outlet Important Stories found that these drones were still reaching Russia via Kazakhstan. But customs data reviewed by The Insider shows that by 2024, imports of ready-made drones and branded parts from major manufacturers had dropped to near zero — whether shipped directly from China or routed through Kazakhstan.

Despite an overall drop in the import of electronic components to Russia, supplies to drone manufacturers have continued to grow. Imports now include not only spare parts, but also equipment for drone production — such as furnaces, dryers, winding equipment, cylindrical grinders, lathes and milling machines, injection molds, casting machines, 3D printers, and cutting, stamping and bending machines.

The Insider has found that drone manufacturers and their suppliers primarily import engines (which account for 38% of import value), along with controllers (25%) and batteries (20%).

One standout company is Rustakt, whose imports from early 2023 to mid-January 2025 totaled nearly 40 billion rubles ($494 million) — a record for Chinese drone component shipments to Russia. The company officially produces the VT-40 drone (also known as PVC, “Judgment Day,” or “Sudoplatov”). The “VT” in the drone’s name is in honor of pro-war propagandist Vladlen Tatarsky, who was killed in 2023 by an exploding statue of himself that had been presented as a gift.

Although its Chinese supplier Shenzhen Kiosk Electronic and its affiliate Shenzhen Nasmin Technology manufacture a variety of devices, it is precisely this customizable drone that is advertised on the Chinese companies’ official website and their Alibaba marketplace page.

The VT-40’s components are almost entirely imported: Rustakt sources controllers, batteries, antennas, motors, cameras, and even plastic shells and nuts from China. Some shipments go directly to Bataysk, which appears to house a drone assembly facility. Russian pro-war Telegram channels have criticized the inflated pricing of the VT-40 — reportedly costing 20,000 rubles ($247) to build, with a sale price of 40,000 ($494) — and questioned its performance, claiming the drone was an ineffective PR project that often failed to reach its targets.

“Lately, there’s been a growing number of complaints from the front lines about the ‘Sudoplatov’ drones. The issue is there’s pressure to produce flashy footage of strikes on vehicles, while actual combat needs are being ignored — for example, when multiple drones are required to fly into a bunker entrance to allow assault infantry to close in and reduce casualties,” wrote self-styled Russian “war correspondent” Roman Saponkov in December 2023.

In January 2024, a Ukrainian strike hit the testing site for Russian FPV drone operators, killing 24 people. One theory suggests the drones’ uniform transmitter frequencies, a result of rapid mass production, made them easy targets for Ukrainian electronic warfare systems.

By May 2024, according to Saponkov, the Defense Ministry had cut ties with the Sudoplatov project. However, the manufacturer’s own Telegram channel indicates that the drones are still being used on the front.

Problems have also emerged at drone producers Sibiryachok and Sibir. In late 2024, a criminal case was launched against Vladislav Pylysky, former head of the “Siberian Navigation Company.” A source told state-run news agency TASS that “the Defense Ministry had questions about the quality of engines used in UAVs intended for the armed forces.”

The Siberian Navigation Company, along with UAMOC, co-owns LLC EVR (ООО «ЭВР»), which manufactures the Sibiryachok drone. The company is propped up by billions of rubles from the Moscow city budget.

How to stop Russia from producing drones

Russia’s drone industry started from scratch, overcoming customs barriers, the dominance of massive old-school defense enterprises, and a lack of understanding of the role FPV drones would play in the war. The business attracted a diverse crowd, from drone-racing enthusiasts to former civilian drone engineers. These early key players in what has become a lethal industry quickly secured major investments, and many eventually moved into the government sector.

Today, Russia’s modern drone manufacturers can be broadly divided into three informal groups: those backed by “progressive” Moscow-based innovation hubs, those aligned with legacy defense plants, and those that remain independent. The entire sector is heavily reliant on imports: batteries, flight controllers, motors, and cameras are primarily sourced from China. Unusually for Russia’s military-industrial complex, the supply chain for drone components is highly concentrated, making it uniquely vulnerable.

The parts needed for mass-market drones are inexpensive, relatively simple, and do not rely on top-tier Western or European microchips. As a result, the West has limited leverage: imposing sanctions on garage-based drone makers is unlikely to stop the steady flow of components from China. The real power lies with Beijing — which could, with a single policy decision, determine the fate of Russia’s drone industry.

Such a move would significantly affect the course of the war in Ukraine. Although Russia boasts a well-developed domestic industry for manufacturing larger fixed-wing drones, it lacks the capacity to establish large-scale production of all key FPV drone parts within a reasonable time frame.

For example, if China were to ban the export of miniature electric motors to Russia — which in the Russian market have few uses outside of drone assembly — the entire production chain would come to a halt. Even if Russia were to establish its own mass production of these electric motors — which, under current conditions, would likely take at least a year to accomplish — China could simply restrict another critical component in response.

U.S. dollar values in the piece are based on the USDRUB rate as of May 16, 2025, unless otherwise specified.